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ABSTRACT: This article explains Peru’s efforts to develop
effective strategies. It discusses the problems created by overlapping
authorities. It suggests a more integrated approach to developing
national strategy would help resolve the complications associated
with high levels of drug trafficking, poverty, and terrorism.

A

severe Peruvian security challenge in the valley of the Apurimac,
Ene, and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM) has been brought about by
a combination of three maladies: drug trafficking, poverty, and
terrorism. At the end of 2016, the largest area of coca cultivation (46
percent or 20,304 hectares) and production (70 percent or an estimated
256 metric tons of cocaine) centered in the VRAEM.1 Poverty, which
afflicts 49 percent of the region’s population (approximately 650,000
inhabitants), complicates Peru’s efforts to counter drug trafficking.
Furthermore, low levels of education and limited economic opportunities
led most of the population to depend on coca cultivation for its survival.
Thus, many people in the valley defend this illicit activity.2 Since the
region is isolated from the major population centers, local governments
have little incentive to dedicate resources to the region. Hence, interest
in stopping drug trafficking shifts to the national level.
Over the past decade, Peru’s national strategy has fallen short of
its stated objective of defeating the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path,
a terrorist organization that controls the principal transportation
routes into the valley, provides security to the region’s drug cartels, and
directly funds its operations through drug trafficking. Two temporary
organizations created by the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed
Forces—the VRAEM Special Command and the Intelligence and Joint
Special Operations Command—experienced some operational success
toward this mission. However, the Peruvian Armed Forces and National
Police suffered 384 casualties, including 137 deaths, in armed actions
with the terrorists from 2005 to 2014.3
Strategic uncertainty in the region results from the absence of a
clear national security policy, consistent political objectives, and a stable
military objective that spanned several presidential administrations.
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This uncertainty further impedes the formulation of a national military
strategy by preventing the Peruvian Armed Forces from supporting other
efforts to counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, a lack of prioritization
limits the effective allocation of government resources to ministries
and departmental agencies that could develop an optimal strategy for
achieving the nation’s broader strategic objectives.
This article examines the processes and actors involved in developing
such strategic plans as well as the impact of these participants on
government efforts in the VRAEM. Recommendations for structuring
and coordinating state and regional efforts with a whole-of-government
approach to address the region’s challenges successfully are included.

A Whole-of-Government Approach

The Peruvian national defense system lacks the agility and the
flexibility required to achieve the government’s objectives in the
VRAEM. An inability to recognize threats and vulnerabilities clearly
results in slow responses. Furthermore, ministries and government
agencies focus on their own immediate tasks, instead of effectively
coordinating and cooperating toward shared objectives and a focused
vision.4 Because of the interrelated military and socioeconomic
dimensions affecting the region, close interagency collaboration is
necessary to achieve an adequate level of security that will foster
economic development, reduce poverty, and further reinforce security.
In other words, to address the challenges of the VRAEM adequately, the
Peruvian security structure must operate as an effective system instead
of a collection of separate components.
Through integrated efforts, the Peruvian government can provide
economic development that permits the inhabitants of the VRAEM to
remain in the region rather than migrating to other parts of the country,
such as the greater Lima area. Such migration would further degrade
the nation’s security by intensifying other challenges. But a whole-ofgovernment strategy for the VRAEM would address some of these
challenges by attracting people who are more likely to participate in legal
economic activities and who are less likely to support terrorist activities.

Leadership Authorities

Although responsibilities for the national security policy and the
national security strategy are clearly defined by law, responsibilities for
the national military strategy, as it impacts the VRAEM, are not. This
ambiguity impedes the formulation of a single, coherent document that
would establish strategies for achieving military objectives in the region.
In this regard, and because of the political nature of the position, the
minister of defense usually lacks the military knowledge to formulate
the national military strategy optimally. Conversely, the chief of the
Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces can expertly formulate
4      Jason L. Percy and Terry A. Fellows Jr., “A Whole of Government Approach for National
Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 3.
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the national military strategy. But the resulting document has less
authority since the chief has no mandate to do so under Peruvian law.
Thus, the national military strategy is formulated in isolation, creating
confusion and undermining its importance. This situation has led to
competing priorities and approaches that have been counterproductive
in the VRAEM over the last decade.
Further complicating the situation, constitutional and legal
responsibilities for the minister of defense do not indicate the manner
for providing strategic guidance nor the type of strategy that must
be formulated. Consequently, the chief of the Joint Command lacks
clear strategic guidance to help ensure military actions support the
government’s objectives in the region. For example, the ministry
of defense must direct, coordinate, execute, supervise, and evaluate
national security policy, in accordance with presidential decisions.5 By
contrast, the US secretary of defense provides a national defense strategy
based on the national security strategy to ensure military actions support
national objectives. The US national defense strategy then prioritizes
Department of Defense missions, counter strategies, and a framework
to guide prioritizing threats, the force structure, modernization plans,
and the military’s roles and missions.6
By establishing a similar hierarchy for Peruvian strategy, the
minister of defense can provide a foundation for other strategic
guidance, specifically for military planning, force development,
and intelligence.7 This clarity would also allow the chief of the Joint
Command to compose a military strategy that could be integrated with
other government efforts to address the interrelated security, societal,
and developmental challenges in the VRAEM as opposed to limiting
the focus to the Shining Path. One opportunity for integration exists
in relation to a declared state of emergency. In this case, the VRAEM
Special Command is tasked with operations against terrorism without
any doctrinal responsibility to address the challenges, such as poverty
and drug trafficking, that contribute to terrorism.8
Even if empowered by the national military strategy to conduct
operations against drug trafficking, the Peruvian government does not
have an adequate legal framework for the military and police to work
together to meet the evolving threat effectively. Thus, the fight against
this scourge is legally the principal mission of the National Police,
even though the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces and
the VRAEM Special Command have the resources. To overcome this
constraint, the VRAEM Special Command has a component of the
National Police assigned to it. But the other military components must
5      Ollanta Humala Tasso, Juan F. Jiménez, and Pedro Cateriano Bellido, Decreto Legislativo
que Aprueba la Ley de Organización y Funciones del Ministerio de Defensa, Decreto
Legislativo 1134 (2012).
6      Secretary of Defense, 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018).
7      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2017), II-4.
8      “¿Por qué existe el VREAM?,” Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas (CCFFAA),
accessed December 13, 2017.
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focus only on defeating the Shining Path. Accordingly, an appropriate
ratio of police and military resources cannot be used effectively to
counter the interdependent threats of terrorism and drug trafficking.
Beyond the issues raised in the previous paragraphs, the brief duration
in which the chief of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces
is assigned to the position further impedes the development of a holistic
approach to provide security in the VRAEM. According to law, the chief
holds the position for a period of no more than two years, renewable by
exception, only for one additional year.9 This situation contrasts with
that of the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, which begins with a
similar period of two years that may be renewed by the president for two
additional terms.10 Thus, General Joseph Dunford has held the position
since 2015, while his predecessor, General Martin E. Dempsey, held
the position for four years (2011–15).11 This longer period allows the
chairman to develop a deeper understanding of the strategic objectives
and formulate a more effective military strategy.
Furthermore, a new chief of the Joint Command must spend a
large percentage of his or her term learning about the national military
strategy that guides the combatant commands and the key actors in each
region, as well as the internal and external factors that affect missions.
Unfortunately, commanders often rotate from the position before
they acquire enough experience and knowledge needed to address the
problems holistically.
Likewise, changes among senior staff officers compound the effects
of the short term of the Peruvian joint commander. Because of the lack
of a joint culture within the Peruvian Armed Forces, the chief generally
assigns members of the same service to the main positions of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In 2017, the chief of the Joint Command, for example,
was a Navy officer. And not entirely by coincidence, four of the nine
division chiefs were also Navy officers.12 Of the seven autonomous offices
of the Joint Command, five were headed by Navy officers.13 Of the two
combatant commands executing military operations in the VRAEM,
a land operations theater, one was commanded by a Navy officer.14
Despite its experience in countering terrorism and drug trafficking, the
National Police is not represented within the Joint Command. This
situation generates bias that favors the chief’s service affiliation.
The necessity of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces
to attend to its main mission of planning, preparing, coordinating, and
conducting military operations, such as those conducted by the VRAEM
Special Command and the Intelligence and Joint Special Operations
9      Ollanta Humala Tasso, Juan F. Jiménez Mayor, and Pedro Cateriano Bellido, Decreto
Legislativo del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, Decreto Legislativo 1136 (2012).
10      Chairman: Appointment; Grade and Rank, 10 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).
11      “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” JCS, accessed December 17, 2017.
12      “Divisiones Estado Mayor,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
13      “Oficinas Autónomas,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
14       “Se Reconoció al Comandante del Comando Especial de Inteligencia y Operaciones
Especiales Conjuntas (CIOEC),” CCFFAA, October 11, 2016.
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Command in the VRAEM, also impedes its ability to conceptualize,
design, and assess risks relevant to formulating a national military
strategy.15 The United States manages this complexity by assigning the
Joint Chiefs of Staff the role of providing military advice without the
competing demand to manage operational campaigns.16

Strategy Implementation

The insufficient results of the VRAEM Special Command during
its first three years led the Joint Command to create the Intelligence and
Joint Special Operations Command. This combatant command includes
intelligence personnel and special forces from the three military services
who execute operations in the region against high-value targets, such
as the leaders of the Shining Path.17 The parallel efforts of these two
combatant commands in the same area of responsibility generated
friction and competitiveness.
In addition to these overlapping responsibilities, 69 districts of five
political regions in the VRAEM formed a more intricate problem when
implementing the national military strategy.18 This vast area of direct
intervention and influence hinders the VRAEM Special Command’s
efforts because actions must be coordinated with the disparate political
authorities who have different priorities and resources for each region.
Luis Rojas, a former technical secretary of the multisectoral Commission

Map of the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro by Pete McPhail
15      “Misión,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
16      10 U.S.C. § 152.
17      “Se Reconoció al Comandante,” CCFFAA.
18      “Reordenan Ámbitos de Intervención Directa y de Influencia del VRAEM,” Andina (Lima),
June 10, 2016.

52

Parameters 48(3) Autumn 2018

for Pacification and Economic and Social Development in the Valley
of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro, recognized the need for
the VRAEM to become an autonomous region backed by adequate
resources that could formulate a coherent plan for its development.19
The current legal framework, however, is inadequate for the
Peruvian Armed Forces to conduct operations in the region beyond the
campaign against the Shining Path. In November 2017, the Peruvian
Congress approved a bill authorizing military participation in drug
trafficking interdiction within zones declared in a state of emergency,
which includes jurisdictions of the VRAEM.20 While the approval of
this bill will provide a legal framework for a national military strategy to
include the fight against drug trafficking, it generates additional risks for
the VRAEM Special Command. These risks are magnified due to the
lack of training and experience of the Peruvian Armed Forces in carrying
out operations against drug trafficking, which is in stark contrast to that
of the National Police who currently execute this mission.

Recommendations

To address the challenges identified above, Peru must change its
process for formulating and implementing its national military strategy.
Peru must develop a whole-of-government approach that unifies the
efforts of ministries and agencies to maximize the effectiveness of
available resources. Therefore, the national military strategy and the
VRAEM Special Command mission should be broadened to orient
military forces toward working with other government organizations to
solve drug trafficking, poverty, and terrorism in the VRAEM.
In this manner, the national military strategy could focus not only on
defeating the Shining Path but also on collaborating with the National
Police to fight drug trafficking. The military engineer battalions could
also support regional development by constructing roads and schools.
These kinds of actions will help the government obtain the support
and trust of the population. Such measures will also provide access to
information about members of the Shining Path and the drug cartels.
To develop and implement a more coherent and effective military
strategy in the VRAEM, the Peruvian congress should establish clearer
legal responsibilities regarding who formulates the national defense
strategy and the national military strategy. Ideally, the changes should
clarify the minister of defense is responsible for the national defense
strategy and the chief of the Joint Command for the national military
strategy. Regardless, those formulating the national military strategy
should address the major problems in the VRAEM and efficiently
integrate the area’s military and police resources. Similarly, the congress
should consider creating a unified political region for the VRAEM based
19      “¿El VRAEM como una Región para Buscar su Desarrollo?,” El Comercio (Lima),
April 22, 2015.
20      “Congreso Aprobó que Fuerzas Armadas Participen en la Interdicción Contra el Tráfico de
Drogas en el VRAEM,” Correo (Lima), November 3, 2017.
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on the local districts and provinces. Doing so would enable the political
authorities and the VRAEM Special Command to coordinate efforts,
such as public projects to stimulate development, more effectively.
Beyond such legal changes, attention should be given to military
commands. The Peruvian government should lengthen the tenure for
the chief of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces by at least
two years. This extended period would allow the chief to understand the
complex issues in the region more deeply, design the military strategy,
and make the corresponding adjustments.
Joint commanders should work to ensure equitable distribution of
senior assignments among the military services, including the National
Police. This diversity would provide an integral joint approach to inform
a more comprehensive national military strategy.
The government should also redefine the roles and responsibilities
of the Joint Command to eliminate the responsibility of conducting
operations, which should be delegated to the combatant commands.
This modification would allow the Joint Command to focus on strategic
guidance for integrating the police and other elements of national
power to achieve the state’s objectives. This change would also reduce
overlapping authorities such as those between the VRAEM Special
Command and the Intelligence and Joint Special Operations Command.
To conduct more effective operations in the VRAEM, the Peruvian
Armed Forces should correspondingly increase the training of military
personnel assigned to the region. Participants in counterterrorism and
counternarcotics operations should be knowledgeable of the policy
guidance and legal authorities established by the aforementioned
frameworks. Furthermore, joint commanders should leverage the
experience of other organizations that have appropriate experience in
the operational environment, such as the National Police, to help orient
personnel to the complexities of specific missions.

Conclusion

The national military strategy implemented in the VRAEM during
the last decade has proven ineffective. The approach has lacked coherence
and failed to integrate the efforts of various ministries and agencies. As
this article has shown, formulating and implementing an effective policy
in the VRAEM requires a series of fundamental changes ranging from
specific actions to state and military organization. As noted, security
comes from the strength and the application of all the instruments of
national power. To this end, the Peruvian government must prioritize
the urgent issues in the VRAEM and ensure an effective interaction
among all the ministries and agencies.
Correspondingly, the Joint Command must assume an advisory role
and integrate the capacities of the National Police to unify action in the
region. With these changes, the national strategy can address the critical
security issues within the VRAEM through strong commitment and
common effort from all the actors involved.

